By John Capobianco
For two days in early October, the people building and operating the Model Context Protocol gathered in Toronto for MCP Dev Summit, hosted by the Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF) under the Linux Foundation. The organizers framed the event around enterprise and regulated environments, which meant the agenda was less about hello-world demos and more about the unglamorous work of production: identity, authorization, auditability, gateways, registries, evaluation and reliability.
This agenda shows how far the conversation has traveled. A year ago the debate was whether MCP would become the standard. In Toronto, nobody spent time on that. The questions on stage were about what it takes to let an agent act on production systems without losing track of who authorized what, with which credentials, under whose policy.
For infrastructure teams, that is the question that matters. Networks are where a hallucinated change becomes an outage at machine speed. It is also the question Itential has been working on since we shipped our MCP server in May 2025.
I presented NetClaw, an open-source network engineering agent, at the summit. The premise of that work fits the production conversation: networks are stateful, high-consequence systems, and an autonomous loop needs structured skills and predictable execution. That is the infrastructure lens I bring to what we heard in Toronto.
Den Delimarsky, MCP lead maintainer at Anthropic, opened day one with a history lesson. Before MCP, every AI integration was custom work and the ecosystem was a patchwork. Since its late-2024 release, the protocol has become the default way agents reach the outside world, backed by mature SDKs that spare teams from rebuilding integrations for each model provider.
The roadmap he published with fellow lead maintainer David Soria Parra in August sets the next agenda: agent identity and enterprise-ready security built on existing standards such as proof-of-possession tokens, workload identity federation and token exchange; progressive discovery, so clients learn tools as they need them rather than swallowing an entire catalog; a single HTTP-native transport following the stateless 2026-07-28 specification; and messaging primitives for long-running agentic work.
A substrate is not a control plane. As MCP becomes the common way agents reach tools, the enterprise question becomes what sits between the agent and the infrastructure it acts on.
MCP at the edge, governed execution in the middle. It also explains the changes we have made as the protocol matured. We added Streamable HTTP in July 2025 and have put SSE on a deprecation path. Remote transports support OAuth 2.0 and JWT. Tag-based tool selection keeps the tools presented to a client focused, while tool annotations describe read-only and destructive behavior.
The protocol’s roadmap and those capabilities address related production concerns. Transport, identity, and discovery make tools accessible. The execution layer still has to decide what an agent is allowed to do with them.
Kevin Ng and Dana Harrison of TELUS, the Canadian telecommunications provider, showed what a complete enterprise MCP practice looks like after a full year in production. Their walkthrough covered an operations agent called IRIS that handles real operational requests from Slack and is itself exposed as an MCP server; automation workflows that call MCP tools to take routine platform chores off engineers’ plates; an internal registry where teams find existing connectors before building duplicates; and remote hosting on their Cloudflare Workers-based platform.
They also took on enterprise OAuth directly, explaining why they chose Client ID Metadata Documents over Dynamic Client Registration.
The useful lesson for infrastructure teams is how those pieces work together. Workflows consume tools, agents are reachable through the same protocol, and a shared catalog gives teams somewhere to look before building another connector.
Those relationships also exist in Itential FlowAI. Tools registered through the FlowMCP Gateway surface as native gateway services that Studio workflows and FlowAgents can invoke alongside Ansible or Python. In the other direction, the Itential MCP Server lets an external MCP client trigger FlowAgents and follow their sessions. Gateway Manager provides the catalog where a NetBox or pyATS connector can be registered once and reused.
For a network operator, that reuse has to fit the existing permission model. RBAC, approvals, and audit belong in the path through which the shared tool is used.
Chris Alexiuk explained that MCP sits at the center of NVIDIA’s AI-Q and its wider agent tooling, then shared what has survived contact with production: controlling which tools an agent can see, authorizing calls, supporting many users on shared deployments, enforcing guardrails, and adapting as the specification changes underneath you. He also gave the operating model a name: MaaS, or MCP as a Service, where MCP servers are run as shared, centrally managed infrastructure and their tools are offered to agents on demand, rather than every team standing up and wiring its own.
Shared infrastructure makes the tool-selection question unavoidable. A catalog can serve many teams, but each agent still needs a deliberate set of tools for its job.
The Itential MCP Server uses tag-based tool selection, with documented profiles for platform administrators, network engineers, automation developers, and operators. Inside the platform, a FlowAgent can call only the tools its builder attached at build time. Multi-user identity comes from the platform’s AAA integration. The guardrails live in deterministic workflows.
MaaS also describes the service model behind the FlowMCP Gateway. Teams bring the MCP servers they already run, such as NetBox, pyATS, or an ITSM system, and register them through the gateway. Their tools become native gateway services that agents and workflows can use through the shared catalog, subject to tool selection and permissions.
That is how the shared-service idea connects to infrastructure operations: teams reuse capabilities while the gateway remains responsible for their governed execution. The server-registration and credential details matter, and I will come back to those below.
Michael Forrester of Accenture LearnVantage told a story every enterprise will recognize. It began with a demo that worked perfectly: a single agent calling a single tool over MCP in about a minute. Then came the question of how many people would need access, and the honest answer was possibly everyone, perhaps 750,000. Nobody had formally approved any of it, and as he put it, “There was also nowhere to say no.”
The architecture that followed had a few load-bearing pieces: a registry that serves as the authoritative list of approved servers, their owners and what agents are allowed to find; a gateway that every agent-to-tool call must traverse, so identity checks, authorization, throttling and policy live in one place instead of inside each server; a GitOps-managed control plane with admission checks that stop unapproved servers from being deployed; runtime monitoring of tool execution; and workload identity that tells the gateway which agent is making each call.
That foundation carried a rollout toward 200,000 internal users at one company.
Forrester’s story made the governance question concrete. A working demo becomes an organizational problem when there is no place to approve a server, deny access, or enforce that decision before a tool runs.
That is the role the FlowMCP Gateway plays in Itential. Registering an MCP server requires operator-level access in Itential Gateway. Credentials live in the gateway’s secrets manager and are never returned in plaintext. Discovered tools become native gateway services that inherit the Gateway Manager permission model, and a FlowAgent can invoke only the tools explicitly attached to it.
That is a place to say no, built into the execution path. It connects the operational problem described on stage to the controls infrastructure teams need before adopting another server or agent.
On the breakout stage, Martin Au-yeung brought lessons from building plugin submissions at OpenAI, showing how MCP extensions can deliver interactive interfaces inside ChatGPT and Codex that keep users coming back. It was another sign of how thoroughly MCP has become shared ground across the industry: OpenAI engineers now sit among the protocol’s core maintainers, including on its transport work.
A shared protocol also changes where the user can start. Claude, ChatGPT, Codex, Claude Code, and custom harnesses can provide different front ends to the same platform capabilities. The controls governing those capabilities need to hold regardless of the client.
The Itential MCP Server exposes the platform to MCP clients and ships example prompts for both Claude and GPT. Inside FlowAI, the Model Registry lets LLM admins bring their own model provider, enable specific models, and decide which builder groups may use them.
Reasoning is pluggable. Governed execution is not.
The keynote discussions carried into the breakouts. Guardrails, tool selection, and execution reliability kept surfacing, with more detail about where production systems succeed and where they fail.
Hillary Curran presented a Linux Foundation Research and AAIF study built on interviews with 22 leaders running agentic systems, many in regulated industries. Nearly all of them use MCP, even if they disagree about where it goes next. Two patterns came up again and again: a gateway between agents and models for governance and cost control, and guardrails enforced beneath the model instead of through prompts, because the model is exactly what an attacker is trying to manipulate and cannot be its own safeguard.
What keeps agents stuck in demos is not what they can do, but whether the organization can trust them.
Other sessions reinforced the point. Shakthi Bachala’s zero-trust testing approach uses AI to hunt for dangerous combinations of tool calls but anchors the final verdict in deterministic policy and evidence. Pubudu Gunatilaka argued that as user identity passes through chains of servers, the gateway is where tokens should be swapped, scoped down and logged. And Daniel Davidson treated third-party MCP servers as potential insiders: each one runs someone else’s code while carrying keys to your systems.
For infrastructure, that puts enforcement in the execution path. In Itential, agents do not hold device credentials; the gateway brokers them. Policy is enforced by the execution engine that actions pass through, rather than relying on instructions a model can be talked out of.
Huanran Wang profiled real agent tool-call chains on a GPU and found that MCP protocol handling accounted for about 0.06 percent of wall-clock time. The real cost was the tool registry: at roughly 204 tokens per tool, a thousand tools overflow the context window before any work begins, so choosing which tools to expose is not optional. Dheeraj Pai and Lu Xian benchmarked small and mid-sized open-weight models and reported that standardized MCP OAuth and RBAC, with no other changes, lifted task-completion accuracy by more than 60 percent.
Edmund Lam, and separately Kashish Verma and Sreeram Venkitesh, made the design case that good MCP tools capture intent rather than mirroring API endpoints.
Taken together, that is a strong argument that RBAC is an accuracy feature as much as a security one. A FlowAgent sees a curated tool set, chosen per agent and bounded by its project.
Many of those tools are Itential workflows, which capture intent by construction: provisioning a VPC and allocating its subnets from IPAM is one tool, not forty API calls for a model to plan around.
Dilawar Javaid built an incident-response agent spanning observability, Kubernetes and GitHub MCP servers to show that the protocol handles discovery and invocation but leaves planning, retries and recovery to someone else. His answer was a lightweight orchestration layer with deterministic checkpoints, idempotent steps and explicit retry rules, rather than one free-running agent loop. Nidhi Singh’s account of more than 20,000 production tool invocations included a sobering example: one faulty validation pattern quietly wiped inventory counts for more than 70 sellers.
This is the same constraint behind the NetClaw work I presented. Networks are the final frontier for AI in operations: stateful, high-consequence, and intolerant of hallucinated changes. Structured skills constrain an agent far better than a pile of raw device access, and spec-driven development keeps an autonomous loop predictable.
This is the heart of FlowAI. Agents reason; workflows execute.
When a FlowAgent decides what should happen, the change itself is carried out by a deterministic workflow that runs the same way every time, with pre-checks, post-checks, rollback, and a complete audit trail.
Teams decide how much human oversight each action needs, from approving every step to supervising by exception.
The operational questions in Toronto also explain the progression of our MCP stack. Itential published the first release of its open-source MCP server, itential-mcp, on May 1, 2025, and launched it publicly on May 28, 2025, at the Network Automation Forum’s AutoCon 3 in Prague, making Itential the first in the network infrastructure space to ship an MCP server.
Whatever an agent proposes passes through workflows, validation checks, and approvals that enforce policy on the Itential Platform before anything touches a device.
Being first only matters if you keep going. The server has shipped continuously since launch, tracking the protocol as it evolved, and it now sits alongside FlowAI and the FlowMCP Gateway as one part of a complete MCP architecture.
| When | Milestone | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| May 2025 | itential-mcp v0.1.0 published as open source; public launch at AutoCon 3, Prague | First MCP server in network infrastructure, exposing workflows, devices and compliance to AI through governed tools |
| Jul 2025 | Streamable HTTP transport and tag-based tool selection | Remote-ready deployment, with tool sets scoped by role instead of one giant catalog |
| Nov 2025 | JWT and OAuth 2.0 for HTTP transports, TLS, Kubernetes health endpoints; FlowAI unveiled at AutoCon 4, Austin | Enterprise authentication for remote MCP; the agentic layer enters private preview |
| Jun 2026 | FlowAI generally available at Cisco Live US | FlowAgents run in production with RBAC, approval gates and full audit |
| Jul 2026 | Agent session and automation tools added to itential-mcp | External AI clients can trigger and observe FlowAgents, not just workflows |
| Aug 2026 | itential-mcp 0.14: roughly 77 tools carrying MCP tool annotations, an elicitation confirmation gate, SSE deprecation | Clients can tell read-only actions from destructive ones; exports that contain secrets require explicit confirmation |
| 2026 (Platform 6.5, Gateway 5.5) | FlowMCP Gateway | Teams bring their own MCP servers into Itential under the same governance model |
The practical answer to the summit’s questions is an architecture that connects agents to tools while preserving a governed execution path. Itential’s MCP architecture runs in two directions, and the distinction matters.
Two directions of MCP, one governed execution path. External AI reaches in through the Itential MCP Server; FlowAgents and workflows reach out to your MCP servers through the FlowMCP Gateway. Both pass through the same RBAC, AAA, and audit.
The Itential MCP Server exposes platform capabilities, including workflows, device management, compliance, gateway services, and FlowAgents, to external AI assistants such as Claude, ChatGPT, and Claude Code. The FlowMCP Gateway connects external MCP servers to the platform so FlowAgents and workflows can use their tools natively.
The two compose cleanly: Claude can trigger an Itential workflow through the MCP Server, and that workflow can call a tool registered through the FlowMCP Gateway, with every hop governed.
Inside the platform, a FlowAgent lives in an Agent Project and has four parts:
The catalog those tools come from is broad: Studio workflows, adapter and integration APIs, gateway services written in Python, Ansible, or OpenTofu, Lifecycle Manager actions, compliance plans, other agents, and tools discovered through the FlowMCP Gateway. Whatever the agent calls, Gateway Manager and Itential Gateway execute it at runtime, on the same path that already runs Itential automation.
Execution is hybrid by design. Agents can call workflows; workflows can hand a single decision to an agent through the Run Agent task and resume with its output; agents can call other agents. Teams can adopt AI one decision at a time, without replacing the automation that already works.
Most organizations already run MCP servers they care about, whether that is NetBox as the source of truth, pyATS for live device state, an AIOps platform, an ITSM system or an in-house data service. The FlowMCP Gateway, an extension of Itential Gateway 5.5 and later running with Platform 6.5 and later, brings those servers under Itential governance without a custom integration for each one.
Registration is deliberately simple. An operator supplies the server’s details, and Itential Gateway connects to it, discovers the tools it exposes and publishes them in Gateway Manager as native gateway services. The gateway supports multiple MCP transports and detects the right one automatically when none is specified. Credentials are referenced from the gateway’s secret store rather than typed in plain text. MCP server definitions travel with gateway database exports and resolve secrets by alias in the target environment, so promoting from lab to production does not expose credentials.
When a server adds tools, rediscovery picks them up; when a server is removed, all of its tools are withdrawn at once.
MCP-backed services behave like every other gateway service: they inherit the same permission model, appear in the same catalog, report errors in the same formats, and land in the same audit trail.
That continuity is what connects the registry-and-gateway pattern Accenture described to day-to-day infrastructure operations. Bringing in another MCP server extends the catalog without creating a separate permission model or execution path for its tools.
If one idea echoed through Toronto, it was to enforce identity and policy once, at the gateway, rather than re-implementing them in every server. Itential layers authentication, authorization and accounting across every surface a human or an agent can touch, with fine-grained permissions at each layer.
| Layer | Control | Where It Lives |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Enterprise identity through LDAP, Active Directory, RADIUS and SAML SSO, with Entra ID group sync and OAuth service accounts for automation | Itential Platform AAA |
| MCP client access | OAuth 2.0, JWT and TLS for remote HTTP transports | Itential MCP Server |
| Model access | LLM admins choose providers, enable specific models and decide which builder groups may use them | FlowAI Model Registry |
| Build rights | Owner, Editor and Viewer roles per Agent Project; the project is the security boundary and the unit of promotion between environments | FlowAI Agent Projects |
| Tool rights | Each agent calls only the tools explicitly attached at design time; who may run each agent is controlled per agent | FlowAI Agent Builder |
| Trigger rights | Manual, scheduled, API and event triggers governed at the automation level, consistent with workflows | Operations Manager |
| MCP server registration | Operator-level access required; credentials held in the gateway secrets manager and never returned in plaintext | Itential Gateway (FlowMCP) |
| MCP tool execution | MCP-backed services inherit the Gateway Manager permission model with no separate configuration | Gateway Manager |
| Client-side safety | Role-based tool tags, read-only and destructive annotations, and confirmation before exports that contain secrets | Itential MCP Server |
| Accounting | Every tool call logged; session traces of reasoning steps, tool calls and linked jobs, with pause, resume and cancel, plus token-usage analytics | Agent Sessions, Operations Manager |
The 2026-07-28 specification made MCP stateless, and the roadmap now targets agent identity, delegation and proof-of-possession tokens. When identity, policy and audit are enforced in one governed layer instead of inside every server, changes like these are absorbed in one place.
Boil the summit down and three conclusions remain.
Itential has been building toward that architecture through the MCP Server, FlowAI, and the FlowMCP Gateway. We shipped our MCP server in May 2025. FlowAI, the agentic harness of the Itential Platform, brought governed agents to general availability in June 2026. The FlowMCP Gateway lets teams bring their own MCP servers under the same RBAC and AAA as other platform capabilities. Underneath every agent sits the deterministic workflow engine enterprises already trust with their networks.
The substrate is settled. The control plane is where the work is now, and it is where Itential lives.
🧑💻 Install the open-source server with pip install itential-mcp or explore it at github.com/itential/itential-mcp.
📄 Read up on docs for FlowAI and the FlowMCP Gateway.
👥 Bring your questions, builds and war stories to the VibeOps Forum.
See how Itential connects AI reasoning to governed execution across your entire infrastructure.